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THE SOUND OF SILENCE
DAN ROSEN*
Except for that which President Bush assures us was not a factor
in his selection, Clarence Thomas has very little in common with
the man he succeeds on the Supreme Court. Thomas, a member
of the party that claims to believe in streamlined government,
made his name in the bureaucracy. Thurgood Marshall, a man
whose party has no aversion to big government, spent most of his
life fighting it.
Thomas, the insider, and Marshall, the outsider. Thomas, the
Holy Cross/Yale man, and Marshall, the product of Lincoln and
Howard. Thomas, the champion of the individuals rising above
their circumstances, and Marshall, the NAACP leader devoted to
collective action to change the circumstances.
They are the yin and yang of judicial appointments. Yet, despite
their many differences, Justices Thomas and Marshall have one
thing in common: their desire to reveal next to nothing on the
most pressing issues in their confirmation proceedings.
It may be fashionable to think that evasion only became popular
after Robert Bork provided a willing target for Democratic ar-
rows.' The fact is, however, that circumnavigating the questions
of would-be opponents has a long, if not venerable, history.
For Thurgood Marshall, the landmines were criminal proce-
* Professor of Law, Loyola University, New Orleans. My musing on this subject began
in a seminar taught by Professors Burke Marshall and Joseph Goldstein at the Yale Law
School in 1983. 1 have no doubt that some of what I say in this essay was first heard in that
seminar, but time obscures the origin of ideas, and I cannot say with confidence which
thoughts sprang up spontaneously in my head and which were filed away from the in-
terchange among participants in that memorable course. So, instead, I acknowledge my
debt and express the hope that I have presented these points in a way that reflects credita-
bly on the seminar. My creditors also include my research assistant Raymond Landry and
the Alfred J. Bonomo, Sr. Fund, which supplied funding for this project.
' See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). Bork did not hesitate
to answer questions from the Judiciary Committee and explain his public pronouncements.
His main complaint, as I understand it, is not that questions were asked but rather that
they were not very good, or that they were intended to misrepresent his positions. Id. at
301-06.
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dure, specifically Miranda v. Arizona2 and civil rights. Like Clar-
ence Thomas on the abortion issue, Marshall invoked the argu-
ment that the issues, in some form, might come before the Court
and, thus, that his response might prejudice his opinion at that
time. Judiciary Committee members unsympathetic to the nomi-
nee were no more impressed by Marshall's parry than they were
with that of Thomas. The difference, however, is that it was the
conservatives who argued that Marshall must answer and the lib-
erals who tried to insulate him. Of course, the lineup was precisely
the opposite in the Thomas hearings, with the President shoring
up the nominee's "I know something you don't know, but I'm not
gonna tell you" responses.
Thus, if we learned nothing else from the hearings into the
nomination of Clarence Thomas and David Souter, it is that absti-
nence is invoked by any party for which it is useful and opposed
by the side for which it is not. President Bush may attempt to
make it into a party issue, but the fact is that Republicans as well
as Democrats are primarily concerned about confirmation or
blockage and will seize upon any grounds to assure their desired
goal.
For example, when Thurgood Marshall was nominated to the
Supreme Court the balance was tipped slightly in favor of the lib-
erals. Miranda was decided by a 5-4 vote, and conservatives were
concerned that the balance would worsen.'
Senator John McClellan of Arkansas attempted to expose Mar-
shall as soft on crime, with the predicate that "the crime rate in
this country has reached proportions where it endangers and jeop-
ardizes our internal security . . . . where we will have a reign of
lawlessness and chaos."" Marshall tried to deflect the questions by
expressing his "great faith in the ability of our country to meet
any emergency." 5 McClellan expressed his dissatisfaction with
Marshall's response:
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 See id. Marshall succeeded Justice Clark, who dissented in Miranda and argued for a
return to the "totality of circumstances" test. Id. at 499, 502 (Clark, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
' Hearings on the Supreme Court Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Committee on the Judici-
ary, United States Senate, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 4 (1967) [hereinafter Marshall Hearings].
Id.
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[Y]ou are going to be in a position where, as one man, you
can say what the Constitution means and make it become the
law of the land. Therefore, I am concerned about your phi-
losophy. I have made mistakes in the past, I admit, in this
area, by not inquiring further and deeper. But the time has
come when I can no longer be silent and not inquire into the
philosophy of those who are nominated to this high position. 6
Specifically, McClellan wanted to know Marshall's opinion on
the Miranda case and others like it, or perhaps just expose it to
provide himself with a reason for voting against the nomination.
Marshall declined to answer on the grounds that such cases would
surely be coming before the Court:
Senator MCCLELLAN: You say you do not disagree or can-
not make any comment on any decision that has been made
in the past?
Judge MARSHALL: I would say that on decisions that are
certain to be reexamined in the Court, it would be improper
for me to comment on them in advance.
Senator MCCLELLAN: I am not talking about cases pending.
Here is a decision that changed the law of the land, if I have
any understanding of it at all. I do not agree with it. If you
do agree with it, I would like you to say so.'
The Chairman of the Committee, Senator James Eastland of
Mississippi, tried another approach, asking Marshall to vouch for
the veracity of comments he made on Miranda at the University
of Texas Law School, reported in the school newspaper, the Daily
Texan. Marshall, according to the paper, had said that "[c]riticism
of [Miranda], especially by police officials, ha[s] no basis .... He
reported he had seen no studies indicating the ruling[ ] ha[d] ad-
verse effects on investigation of crime."8 So, Eastland said, "you
do have an opinion on the exact question Senator McClellan has
been asking you. '
Senator Edward Kennedy, even then a member of the Judiciary
6 Id. at 6.
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Committee, intervened to try to rescue the nominee, but in a way
that hardly comports with his approach in the Souter and Thomas
hearings.
Senator KENNEDY: Actually, Mr. Solicitor General, there
would have been nothing improper for you to express an
opinion down in Texas Law School, because you were not
nominated to the Supreme Court at that time.
Judge MARSHALL: That was the position I took.
Senator KENNEDY: So, actually, now having received the
nomination, then I assume that you have a different responsi-
bility as far as commenting on these matters.
The CHAIRMAN: No; that is not what he said. His testimony
was that his opinion was filed in the brief [in Westover v.
United States]."0
Senator KENNEDY: I am just commenting on this line of
questions, on any opinion that he might have had prior to the
time that he received the nomination; and as that is related
to this line of inquiry, I think it is of some help to have that
clarified.
Judge MARSHALL: Well, the answer to Senator Kennedy is
that once the President announced the nomination, I have
not made any statements to anybody about anything."
Once the audience stopped laughing, Kennedy resumed:
Senator KENNEDY: But-the point that I am driving at is that
you have, as a nominee, a different responsibility, as I under-
stand it, as to commenting on questions that might come up
before the Court-
Judge MARSHALL: I agree with you, sir.
Senator KENNEDY: Than you would have had as the Solici-
tor General.
Judge MARSHALL: Senator, I think it is entirely different,
because before I went on the bench in the second circuit, I
doubt that there were any important opinions of the Su-
preme Court that I didn't comment on one way or the other.
Once I became a judge of the court of appeals, I did not
comment. When I became Solicitor General, on occasions, re-
" See 384 U.S. 436, 494-97 (1966) (No. 761, Westover-companion case to Miranda).
" Marshall Hearings, supra note 4, at 11.
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stricted for the most part to law schools, I thought I had the
right and the duty to explain to law school students the an-
swers to their questions when they wanted to know what the
Supreme Court meant. But I don't think it is proper, as a
nominee for the Supreme Court, to express my opinion.
That is my position.'
By 1991, however, Kennedy apparently had decided that nomi-
nees need not restrain themselves in the way that Thurgood Mar-
shall did and that Senators were not responsible for ensuring that
nominees be kept quiet. On September 11th, Clarence Thomas
discussed his opinions on the First Amendment Establishment
Clause, in particular the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,"
with which he said he had no disagreement. Kennedy tried to par-
lay that opening into an imperative for Thomas to discuss his
views on abortion. Thomas, of course, declined to talk about Roe
v. Wade' before the Committee, on the theory that it was an issue
on which he would have to rule as a Supreme Court Justice.
However, the continued vitality of the Lemon test was coming
before the Court early in the upcoming term as well. Quoting
from the Justice Department's brief in Weisman v. Lee,' 5 Kennedy
pointed out that "[t]he case offers the Court the opportunity to
replace the Lemon test with the more general principle implicit in
the traditions relied upon in Marsh [v. Chambers]"8 and explicit in
the history of the establishment clause."' 7 Kennedy continued:
So if you're confirmed as justice, you'll be sitting on that case
this fall as a member of the Court.'8 Yet, you did not hesitate
yesterday and today to tell us that you have no personal disa-
greement with the Lemon test now being used by the Su-
12 Id.
13 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
14 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
908 F.2d 1090, 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
'6 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983).
Hearings on the Supreme Court Nomination of Clarence Thomas, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 102d Cong., I st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings] (available in
LEXIS, Legis library, Fednew file). The issue in the case was the extent to which nonde-
nominational prayers might be allowed at events such as graduation ceremonies of public
schools. See Weisman, 908 F.2d at 1090.
"8 In fact, arguments were heard on November 6th, shortly after Justice Thomas took
his seat on the Court.
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preme Court. My question is, do you have any personal disa-
greement with the test used by the Supreme Court in the Roe
v. Wade to decide the cases on abortion? That test requires
the state to have a compelling state interest if it is to justify
an infringement on a woman's right to choose an abortion.19
Thomas responded that he had no quarrel with the use of the
strict scrutiny "compelling interest" test in privacy cases involving
fundamental rights, but he declined to say whether abortion was
such a right. "I think that that is important for me to do,"
Thomas said, "in order to not compromise my impartiality. ' 20
Senator Kennedy was not the only member of the Committee to
change his mind on the appropriate scope of questioning. In the
Marshall hearings in 1964, conservative Senator Strom Thur-
mond wanted to question the nominee about the limits of the
Equal Protection Clause in barring discrimination:
Judge MARSHALL: Well, Senator, I would respectfully re-
quest that I not be asked to comment on broad general prin-
ciples of law apparently or allegedly decided by the Supreme
Court period.
Senator THURMOND: Well, probably you would not like for
me to propound any questions to you, but as an appointee by
the President, I think as a Senator who has to advise and con-
sent, I have a responsibility to do this.
Judge MARSHALL: I appreciate that, Senator, and I respect-
fully request that you appreciate my position of not prejudg-
ing lawsuits before I am sent them.21
Yet, in the Thomas, Souter, and Bork hearings, Senator Thur-
mond helped insulate the Republican nominees from pressing
Democratic questions. In fact, Senator Thurmond twice tried to
shut Robert Bork up. While Senator Kennedy was questioning
Bork on the constitutionality of the special prosecutor statute,
Thurmond interjected, "That is a question that may come before
the Supreme Court, and I would caution the witness to be careful
'" Thomas Hearings, supra note 17.
20 Id.
" Marshall Hearings, supra note 4, at 166.
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of what he says on that point.""2 Only moments later he inter-
jected again: "I want to say again that there is a case pending that
may be before the Supreme Court. Again, I would caution the
witness on this point."23
The Chairman of the Committee, Senator Joseph Biden, re-
sponded, "Judge, let me make clear, you are the one to make the
judgment as to whether or not it is something that may in any way
compromise you." 4 Bork replied, "I will say, then, something
that does not compromise me. I have written what I have written.
It is a long opinion, and it is all laid out."2
At the opening of the Souter hearings, Thurmond said, "Direct
questioning about sensitive issues that may come before the Court
could impinge on the concept of an impartial, independent judici-
ary."26 When Souter, then a judge of the court of appeals, refused
to talk about abortion, Thurmond elicited comments from several
witnesses supporting the nominee's position, in one case asking,
"In fact, wouldn't he have violated the rule of ethics if he had
answered such questions?"2 Senator Alan Simpson made the same
point, citing the Code of Judicial Conduct: "A judge should ab-
stain from public comment about a pending or impending proce-
dure in any court."'2 8
The rule, however, does not end there. A subsequent sentence
provides that "[t]his subsection does not prohibit judges from
making public statements in the course of their official duties."29
" Hearings on the Supreme Court Nomination of Robert Bork, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 340 (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearings].
22 Id. at 343.
24 Id.
25 Id.
2 Hearings on the Supreme Court Nomination of David H. Souter, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990) [hereinafter Souter Hearings].
2" Id. at 771.
28 Id. at 26 (quoting ABA CODE OF'JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(6) (1972)).
20 Id. Abe Fortas, when nominated to become Chief Justice, steadfastly refused to an-
swer questions about opinions of the Supreme Court, on the theory that separation of pow-
ers insulated him from any such requirement and, indeed, prevented him from cooperat-
ing. Why that is so was never made clear, for Justice Fortas simply stated that it was not
only his right but also his duty to refrain from discussing any opinions of the- Court,
whether or not he participated in them. Hearings on Nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief
Justice of the United States, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
pt. 1, 214-15 (1968). See generally Note, Must a Supreme Court justice Refuse to Answer Sena-
tors' Questions?, 78 YALE L.J. 696, 698 (1969) (discussing Fortas's failure to respond to Sena-
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There could hardly be a duty more official than that of testifying
before the Senate with regard to a subsequent nomination to the
Supreme Court. Moreover, the elastic definition of "impending"
has been stretched so far, so long, that its tensile strength is all
but gone. Not every issue that could conceivably come before the
Court is impending. And, in any event, discussing the issues of law
that happen to be embedded in cases is not the same thing as dis-
cussing the cases themselves. One can talk about abortion without
commenting on the merits of any particular statute of the "wan-
nabe" states, each of which aspires to provide the fodder for the
overruling of Roe.
In the final analysis, however, if a judge believes he is barred
from testifying due to his position, he can hardly blame the Senate
for refusing to confirm him. The Senate, after all, has a duty too,
a duty that is mandated by the Constitution.
Fortunately, Clarence Thomas did not and future nominees will
not face that dilemma, as the revised Code of Judicial Conduct
limits only those public comments "that might reasonably be ex-
"130pected to affect [a case's] outcome or impair its fairness ....
This relief, of course, will not prevent them, Republican and
Democratic nominees alike, from invoking this incantation to
avoid disclosure; they are "not demonstrating .. .impartiality but
defending ...prospects for confirmation behind a stone wall of
silence."3 1
To his credit, Robert Bork did not attempt to conceal himself
behind such a wall. He neither refrained from answering ques-
tions about his current thinking nor attempted to create an artifi-
cial distinction between what he had said before and after being
tors' questions, refusing to "be an instrument by which the separation of powers specified
in our Constitution is called into question . . . .That is the mandate of our Constitution")
(quoting Fortas Hearings, supra, pt. 1 at 214-15) (statement of Justice Fortas). The Senate,
of course, could have just as readily refused to confirm him for not providing enough in-
formation to allow it to exercise its constitutional duty. The right to remain silent, even if
it exists, does not impose a correlative duty on the Senate to promote the one who asserts
it.
While the nomination of Justice Fortas to the position of Chief Justice eventually was
favorably reported to the full Senate by the Judiciary Committee, a purported ethical
breach led to the report's withdrawal and ultimately to Fortas's resignation.
o ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(9) (1990).
' Thomas Hearings, supra note 17 (statement of Senator Kennedy).
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nominated. Under questioning on what factors he would consider
in an abortion case, he said, "[i]f you want to hear me on that, I
will tell you exactly what I would consider.""2 He then went on to
describe his belief that Roe "comes out of no legitimate constitu-
tional materials, which are primarily text, history and constitu-
tional structure. 33
Despite its manipulation by members of both parties, the ab-
stention approach to Supreme Court confirmation proceedings
now seems to be the accepted norm. Its provenance, however, is
suspect. As recently as 1969, a notewriter in the Yale Law Journal
referred to it as a "new doctrine." However, it was his opinion
that the practice of not commenting on potential future cases was
actually a liberalization, the "old doctrine" holding that "any per-
sonal appearance was improper." '34 Nevertheless, the writer con-
cluded that even the new doctrine was overbroad. Additionally,
Chief Justice Rehnquist once opined that "until the Senate re-
stores its practice of thoroughly informing itself on the judicial
philosophy of a Supreme Court nominee before voting to confirm
him, it will have a hard time convincing doubters that it could
make effective use of any additional part in the selection pro-
cess."" 5 Of course, Rehnquist was writing at a time when conserv-
atives were fuming at the emerging Warren Court and trying to
find a way to break the chain of "progressive" appointments. His
article, in fact, was held up by the editors of the Harvard Law Rec-
ord in genteel deference to the then-pending nomination of Potter
Stewart.
At his own nomination hearings, Rehnquist was true to his
word; he declined to predict how he would rule in any particular
case but freely discussed his past writings and his present state of
thinking. Once on the Court, Rehnquist acted in accordance with
his belief that an expression of opinion, earlier in life, does not
disqualify a Justice from ruling fairly on a case. Everyone has
opinions, he stated, ruling in a case in which litigants moved to
32 Bork Hearings, supra note 22, pt. I at 185.
13 Id. at 186.
" Note, supra note 29, at 707.
31 William H. Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, HARVARD LAW RECORD,
Oct. 8, 1959, at 7.
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disqualify him because of speeches he made on the general subject
of the litigation while in the Justice Department. "Yet," Rehn-
quist wrote in denying the motion, "whether these opinions have
become at all widely known may depend entirely on
happenstance."6
"It would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if [nomi-
nees] had not at least given opinions as to constitutional issues in
their previous careers," Rehnquist wrote. 7 "Proof that a Justice's
mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa
in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of
lack of qualification, not lack of bias." 8
The appearance of this kind of voidness, however, seems to
have become the desideratum in recent Supreme Court
appointments:
Senator LEAHY: So I would assume that it would be safe to
assume that, when [Roe v. Wade] ...came down you're in
law school where recent case laws are discussed, the Roe ver-
sus Wade would have been discussed in the law school while
you were there.
Judge THOMAS: [W]e may have touched on Roe v. Wade at
some point and debated that, but let me add one point to
that, because I was a married student and I worked, I did not
spend a lot of time around the law school doing what the
other students enjoyed so much, and that's debating all the
current cases and all of the slip opinions. My schedule was
such that I went to classes and generally went to work and
went home.
Senator LEAHY: Well, Judge Thomas, I was a married law
student who also worked, but I also found that at least be-
tween classes we did discuss some of the law, and I'm sure
you're not suggesting that there wasn't any discussion at any
time of Roe versus Wade?
Judge THOMAS: I cannot remember personally engaging in
a Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.) (denial of motion to
recuse). As an example, Rehnquist noted that nominees who themselves have served as
lower court judges already have committed themselves on a wide variety of issues. Id. If
such expressions by themselves were fatal, then Supreme Court Justices would have to be
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those discussions ...
Senator LEAHY: Have you ever had discussion of Roe ver-
sus Wade other than in this room? (Laughter) In the 17 or 18
years it's been there?
Judge THOMAS: Only, I guess, Senator, in the fact that, in
the most general sense, that other individuals express con-
cerns one way or the other and you listen and you try to be
thoughtful. If you're asking me whether or not I've ever de-
bated the contents of it, the answer to that is no, Senator.
3 9
Structurally and literally, the Constitution gives little support to
the proposition that nominees should be seen but not heard. It is
true that the Senate's role to advise and consent follows the Presi-
dent's power to appoint and is contained in Article II, which con-
fers the executive power, but history shows that the Framers
thought of the power to name judges as primarily senatorial. The
Committee of Detail in the Constitutional Convention, for exam-
ple, included among its resolutions, "[t]hat a national Judiciary be
established to. consist of one Supreme Tribunal-the Judges of
which shall be appointed by the second Branch of the national
Legislature . "...40
Even under the compromise by which the power is shared with
the President, it is hard to imagine why the Senate would be in-
cluded in the process at all if it were not supposed to investigate
fully the suitability of a nominee. In our system of checks and bal-
ances, no one is dead weight. No one suggests that the Senate rub-
berstamp a President's treaty recommendations, another area in
which the Senate has advise and consent power, even though it
touches and concerns the strong implied authority of the Presi-
dent over foreign affairs. Why should the Senate's role in this Ar-
ticle II arrangement be any different from its authority in the ju-
dicial nomination process?
To be sure, Presidents and the Senate must allow one another
some latitude, lest no one nominee ever be found acceptable. The
responsibility, however, is mutual. The President is obliged to ac-
commodate the Senate just as much as the Senate must take into
3 Thomas Hearings, supra note 17.
40 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 132 (M. Farrand ed., 1911) (July
23, 1787 resolutions).
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account the President's desires. Presidential rhetoric portrays the
Senate as standing in the way of the President's prerogative. The
fact of the matter is that nomination and confirmation is a dance;
either the President or the Senate can lead, but only where the
other agrees to follow.
We are told with a straight face that recent Presidents have not
inquired of nominees about their position on abortion or other
pressing matters of the day. If that is so, it is surely only because
their point of view has already been clearly expressed. I, for one,
find no valor in such abstention. I would hope a President would
not nominate a person to the highest court in the country without
inquiring of his or her thoughts on the most important legal issues
to be faced. For the same reason, I would expect the Senate to do
an equally complete job of ferreting out the nominee's viewpoints.
In all of the discussion in this area no one has said anything
about securing a commitment to vote in a particular way on a case
that will actually come before the Justice. Like a contract that is
against public policy, such an agreement would surely be void and,
in any event, practically unenforceable. A President or the Senate
would no more admit to having made such a deal than a hired
bankrobber would publicly complain that his employer failed to
give him his promised share of the stolen loot.
Although we want judges with open minds, we do not desire
nominees with empty ones. Is there anyone who believes that Su-
preme Court nominees have not formed opinions over the years?
We know they have. We simply trust them to test those opinions
against the particular facts of a case or controversy. The public
utterance of the nominee's opinions, whatever they may be, in no
way compromises the fairness of the hearing. In fact, one might
say the opposite.
If litigants knew what a Justice's thoughts had been at the time
of nomination they could directly address those concerns. Under
the current system, however, litigants do not learn of most nomi-
nees' opinions because the Senate does not insist upon their being
revealed. As a result, the parties and their lawyers must guess at
what predilections are hidden from public view in the minds of
the Justices. This is more fair?
More than twenty years ago, Professor Charles Black went on a
274
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scavenger hunt through the Constitution looking for any evidence
holding that the Senate should defer to a President's choice for
the Supreme Court.41 He came up empty-handed. That being so,
it certainly follows that nothing in the Constitution prevents the
Senate from obtaining the most relevant information in determin-
ing whether the nominee is qualified.
"I have as yet seen nothing textual, nothing structural, nothing
prudential, nothing historical, that tells against this view," Black
wrote. "Will someone please enlighten me?" '42
Silence.
" See Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees,
79 YALE LJ 657, 658-62 (1970).
41 Id. at 664.
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